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 A. Introduction 
Mental health issues are garnering more attention by the media and society in recent 
years.  Society stigmatizes those with mental health problems, viewing them as being sick, 
incompetent, or crazy, undermining both the person’s abilities and freedom of choice1.  This 
stigma is pervasive.  It is found in every aspect of our culture, from the media to the justice 
system.  Congress recognized and attempted to combat this stigma when they enacted the 
Americans with Disabilities Act2 (ADA), giving rights back to a group of people that have often 
felt powerless and frustrated with the lack of compassion and understanding they experience in 
their everyday lives.  While this legislation has been beneficial, it has not eradicated the stigma 
for those that battle mental health issues.    
This paper will explore the result of that stigma by addressing the Third Circuit’s 
decision to allow forcible medication of civilly committed mental health patients in non-
emergency situations, the relevant case law on the subject, and demonstrate how this decision is 
a violation of Title II of the ADA3 and the US Constitution4.  Specifically, three cases are 
relevant to the topic.  First, Washington v. Harper5 was a landmark case heard by the Supreme 
Court, which held that inmates do not have a right to refuse medication as long as there is a 
process in place that allows the inmate to voice his or her concerns.  Next, Hargrave v. Vermont6 
was decided by the Second Circuit Court, which held that a civilly committed patient who 
wished to refuse medication could execute a Durable Power of Attorney (DPOA) and assign the 
power to make decisions regarding medication to a principal, and those decisions can only be 
                                                        
1 See generally 42 USCS § 12101(a)(2) 
2 42 USCS § 12101 
3  28 CFR 35.130 
4 U.S. Const. 
5 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
6 Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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overruled in a court of law.  Finally, the Third Circuit decided Disability Rights v. NJ7, holding 
that patients who have been discharged and are awaiting a new placement can refuse treatment, 
but those still in custody of a state psychiatric hospital do not have the same right.  The rules 
handed down from these cases create a situation that makes it difficult for people with mental 
disabilities to refuse medication when they are committed to a state hospital.  However, two 
different sources of law could bring relief for these patients.  First, Title II of the ADA8 prohibits 
states and local governments from discriminating against those with disabilities.  This regulation 
allows those with mental disabilities to file a lawsuit against state-owned psychiatric hospitals if 
they believe they have suffered from discrimination, such as forcible medication9.  Second, the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution protects citizens from a variety of harms10.  Both 
of these arguments are explored in more detail below.  Finally, this paper will discuss remedies 
and demonstrate how they are reasonable modifications of the existing programs. 
 
B. History of Disparate Treatment 
 This section will explore the cases that are relevant to this topic to give background 
information on the history of this issue in the courts.  In particular, this section will discuss a case 
decided by the Supreme Court and cases decided in the Second and Third Circuits.  These cases 
showcase differing opinions regarding the treatment of mental health patients in state run 
psychiatric hospitals. 
 
                                                        
7 Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm'r, N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 796 F.3d at 296 (3d Cir. 2015). 
8 28 CFR 35.130 
9 42 USCS § 12101 
10 U.S. Const. amend. XIV 
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 1. Washington v. Harper11 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of forced medication for civilly 
committed patients12.  However, they have decided a case that involved forced medication of 
criminally committed patients.  There, the Court decided this was permissible under the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution13.   
In Washington v. Harper14, Harper was convicted of robbery and served time in the 
prison’s mental health unit after being diagnosed with a mental disorder15.  For a time, he 
consented to treatment by antipsychotic drugs, but when he first refused treatment, his physician 
sought to forcibly medicate him16.  In order to do this, the physician had to follow the rules set 
out in SOC Policy 600.30, which states that a physician who wishes to forcibly medicate a 
patient must present his reasons before a special committee; if the committee approves the 
treatment, then the inmate must submit17.  The inmate has certain rights, such as the right to 
attend the meeting, present evidence, receive notice of the diagnosis, to receive assistance during 
the hearing, and to appeal the decision.  Finally, forced medication can only occur for a specific 
period of time, and after that time has lapsed, the process must start over if the inmate continues 
to refuse treatment18.  In Harper’s case, the special committee found that forcible medication was 
appropriate, as he was considered a danger to himself or others as a consequence of his mental 
disorder.  As a result of this decision, Harper was forcibly medicated for one year19.  Harper filed 
a lawsuit, arguing that the hearing before the special committee did not satisfy the Due Process 
                                                        
11 Washington, 494 U.S. 210. 
12 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 5. 
13 Washington, 494 U.S. at 236. 
14 Id.   
15 Id. at 213. 
16 Id. at 214. 
17 Id. at 215-216. 
18 Id. at 216. 
19 Id. at 217. 
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Clause, and sought both damages and injunctive relief20.  The Court recognized that Harper had a 
great interest in whether or not he received treatment via antipsychotic medication, but decided 
that the hearing before the special committee satisfies the Due Process Clause, since an inmate is 
only forcibly medicated if he or she is a danger to himself, herself, or others.  The Supreme 
Court held that it is in the inmate’s best interest to be forcibly medicated in this type of situation, 
and the process outlined in SOC Policy 600.30 comports with the Due Process Clause under 
these circumstances21.   
 While the majority agreed with this decision, there was a compelling dissent authored by 
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall22.  The dissenters stated that forcible medication is 
degrading and a gross violation of the inmate’s liberty23.  They elaborated that the right to choose 
whether or not to be treated by antipsychotic medication is a fundamental right that deserves the 
highest level of protection, and that test was not met in this case, concluding that SOC Policy 
600.30 violates the Due Process Clause and is unconstitutional24. 
 While this case is not concerned with a mental health patient that is civilly committed, it 
does shed some light on various perceptions of people who have mental illnesses.  Here, the 
majority decided that if the person is a danger to himself or others, that person’s right to choose 
how to be treated is disregarded.  On the other hand, the dissent argued that a person’s right to 
choose should almost never be taken from them25.  This case also centers around a person who 
was deemed to be a danger to himself or others, which is a different situation than the cases 
heard by the Second or Third Circuits, and could be the reason why the Supreme Court believed 
                                                        
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 221-223. 
22 Id. at 237. 
23 Id. at 238. 
24 Id. at 241, 243. 
25 Id. at 221-223, 241, 243. 
 6 
they were justified in upholding SOC Policy 600.30.  However, the question as to whether this 
same type of policy should be upheld for those who are civilly committed and not deemed to be 
dangerous remains undecided by the Supreme Court. 
 
 2. Hargrave v. Vermont26 
 In 2003, the Second Circuit addressed the question posed above.  Vermont enacted a 
statute that allows civilly committed mental health patients to execute a durable power of 
attorney (DPOA) and authorize a person, also known as a principal, to make decisions for them, 
including whether or not forcible medication is appropriate27.  If the principal refuses 
pharmacological treatment on behalf of the patient, the statute allows mental health professionals 
to petition a probate court to override their decision.  The court then allows the principal’s 
decision to stand for 45 days, after which the patient’s condition will be reviewed.  If the 
patient’s condition has not improved, the court may decide that forcible medication is 
appropriate and disregard the principal’s request, even in non-emergency situations28.   
 Nancy Hargrave suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and was civilly committed multiple 
times, where she was forcibly medicated but did not exercise her right to execute a DPOA29.  
After being forcibly medicated in a non-emergency situation, she executed a DPOA and filed a 
lawsuit against the state of Vermont, alleging that the statute violated Title II of the ADA and 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act30.  She argued that the statute was discriminatory based on 
her disability, while the state argued that Hargrave fell into the “direct threat” exception outlined 
                                                        
26 Hargrave, 340 F.3d 27. 
27 Id. at 31. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 32. 
30 Id. 
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in the ADA, meaning that those who pose a direct threat to themselves or others are not provided 
protection under the ADA31.   
The court did not agree that all mental health patients that are civilly committed pose a 
direct threat, as the state did not prove that all patients pose a threat to others, per the definition 
of “direct threat” under the ADA.  Also, the court held that the state did not determine whether 
the patient posed a direct threat to others at the time they overrode the principal’s request, which 
can be a significant period of time after commitment, and the patient’s behavior and 
circumstances may have changed significantly since then32.  This determination is a crucial 
requirement when overriding the principal’s request; otherwise, execution of a DPOA has little 
merit and offers little protection to the patient. 
The court then analyzed whether the Vermont statute discriminated on the basis of 
disability.  The court reasoned that the statute enacted a process where only mentally ill patients 
who are subject to forcible medication and execute DPOAs must appeal to a family court if their 
preferences are overridden, where other individuals who are physically disabled may appeal their 
principal’s overridden requests in probate court.  The difference between the two circumstances 
means the statute treats mentally ill patients differently than it treats other types of patients, and 
that is discriminatory per the ADA33. 
Vermont then argued that changing the process by which abrogation of the principal 
occurs would fundamentally alter the program, and the ADA protects programs by prohibiting 
changes that would be a fundamental alteration34.  However, the court reasoned that the program 
is not what would be altered, but rather the way in which the principal’s requests are overridden, 
                                                        
31 Id. at 32, 35. 
32 Id.at 35-36. 
33 Id. at 37. 
34 Id. 
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which would only be a minor change and is allowable by the ADA.  Therefore, the defendants 
lost the case and the court found for the plaintiff35.  
This case focused on the topic of this paper—forcible medication of civilly committed 
mental health patients in non-emergency situations.  The outcome is telling, because the plaintiff 
won on the argument that her rights were violated per the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, 
unlike the plaintiff in Washington v. Harper, who argued and lost on the argument that his 
constitutional rights of procedural due process were violated36.  It appears, based on these two 
cases, that claiming a person suffered discrimination prohibited by the ADA is more persuasive 
than arguing that a person is not adequately protected by procedures.  That conclusion is 
reinforced by a case heard by the Third Circuit this past year.   
 
3. Disability Rights N.J. Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs37 
This case is the main focus of this paper.  The plaintiff’s argument appears to be clumsy, 
and the Third Circuit responds accordingly.  Here, the facts are somewhat similar to Hargrave v. 
Vermont38, but the court narrowly distinguishes the two cases instead of creating a circuit split39.  
The facts and analysis are discussed below. 
The state of New Jersey operates four psychiatric hospitals for civilly committed 
patients40.  There are two different types of patients at the hospitals—those that are civilly 
committed and CEPP patients, or Condition Extension Pending Placement.  These patients no 
longer need the hospital’s services and are waiting on an appropriate alternative placement, but 
                                                        
35 Id.at 38. 
36 Id. at 32; Washington, 494 U.S. 210. 
37 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d 293.  
38 340 F.3d 27. 
39 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 306. 
40 Id. at 295. 
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may not be moved immediately because of a lack of availability, so they can carry their CEPP 
status for some time.  Both types of patients are subject to two different policies for forcible 
medication—AB 5:04A, which addresses forcible medication in emergencies, and AB 5:04B, 
which addresses forcible medication in non-emergency situations41.   As this paper focuses on 
forcible medications in non-emergency situations, AB 5:04B is the only policy that will be 
discussed.   
AB 5:04B states that a mental health patient can be forcibly medicated if he or she has 
been involuntarily committed, has been diagnosed with a mental illness, and poses a risk of harm 
to self, others, or property if the medication is not administered42.  The risk of harm is defined as 
suicidal threats or attempts, severe self-neglect, behavior that places others in reasonable belief 
that they will be harmed, or behavior that has resulted in substantial damage to property.  If a 
patient meets this test, then they may be forcibly medicated once the review process has been 
completed43. 
The review process is similar to judicial review44.  First, the treating physician must file 
an involuntary medication administration report, which gives the reasons why the patient should 
be forcibly medicated.  Next, a panel is assembled of hospital employees who may treat patients 
but are not involved in that particular patient’s treatment, and that panel then conducts a hearing 
to decide if the doctor’s recommendation of forcible medication should be honored45.  The 
patient can attend the hearing and present evidence on his or her behalf, and can request a mental 
health professional, legal counsel, or a client services advocate to attend, all who would assist the 
                                                        




45 Id. at 299. 
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patient through this hearing.  If the chair of the panel and one other member vote that the 
substantive standard is satisfied, meaning that they believe that the patient is mentally ill and 
poses a risk of harm to self, others, or property, the patient can be forcibly medicated.  This 
decision is valid for 14 days, after which a panel may then authorize forcible medication for 90 
days.  If the patient still does not consent to medication at the end of this time period, the hospital 
must start the process over again if they wish to continue forcible medication46.  This policy 
applies to all patients, including those labeled as CEPP47, an issue the Third Circuit deals with in 
this case.   
Disability Rights, the plaintiff, made two arguments, the first being that AB 5:04B was a 
violation of the patient’s due process rights.  Specifically, they argued that the process outlined 
above does not satisfy their due process rights because it is not a judicial process48.  They 
brought this claim under Title II of the ADA, which posits that state entities may not 
discriminate against disabled persons by excluding them from a “service[], program[], or 
activit[y]”49.  The plaintiffs argued that the judicial process is the service they are being excluded 
from, instead of the right to refuse medication50.  The court appeared confused by this argument, 
believing Disability Rights to be mistaken and even asked the plaintiffs to clarify what exactly 
they were arguing.  The Third Circuit noted that Disability Rights had at one time argued that the 
“service[], program[], or activit[y]” being denied was the right to refuse forcible medication; 
however, the plaintiffs reiterated that their argument was confined to the judicial process, or 
procedural aspect, instead of a right to refuse medication as a violation of the ADA51.  Therefore, 
                                                        
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 301. 
49 42 USCS § 12134 
50 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 301. 
51 Id. at 302-303. 
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the court confined its analysis to a procedural argument and thus a procedural remedy, and did 
not consider whether the right to refuse medication could be considered a “service[], program[], 
or activit[y]” protected by the ADA52. 
The Third Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs must lose, because the right to a judicial 
process is not guaranteed to nondisabled people, and interpreted Title II of the ADA as only 
extending the rights traditionally given to nondisabled people to those who are disabled53.  
Specifically, all New Jersey citizens are entitled to a judicial process when they are being 
committed; however, after that point, there is no such protected right.  The only protected rights 
that civilly committed patients have in New Jersey are those contained in AB 5:04.  The Third 
Circuit reasoned that the ADA does not guarantee that disabled people receive the same 
procedural treatment when being cared for or treated as those who are not disabled54.  However, 
New Jersey law does protect the rights of other patients, such as hospital patients, to refuse 
medication and treatment.   This differs from the argument the plaintiffs made, which is 
specifically focused on the lack of judicial processes, and not the right of refusal55. 
The Third Circuit then addressed Hargrave v. Vermont56, which the plaintiffs relied upon 
when presenting their argument57.  The Third Circuit distinguished the case before them from 
Hargrave, stating that the plaintiffs in Hargrave successfully identified a service, program, or 
activity that was being excluded from those that were civilly committed and refusing treatment—
the right to execute a DPOA only to have the principal’s decisions overridden in family court.  
Disability Rights failed to identify a similar program, activity, or service, and as such the court 
                                                        
52 Id. at 304. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 305. 
56 Hargrave, 340 F.3d 27. 
57 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 305. 
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reasoned that there was not a circuit split.  The court reiterated that Hargrave further proves their 
point—Title II only protects a disabled person from being denied a benefit from a public entity 
that has been given to nondisabled people58.  Therefore, the Third Circuit held that both CEPP 
and non-CEPP patients lost the Title II claim59. 
Disability Rights also argued that the process outlined in AB 5:04B violated the Due 
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution60.  The Third Circuit 
addressed this claim differently for CEPP and non-CEPP patients61.  The court used Harper62 to 
determine that non-CEPP patients’ constitutional rights had not been violated, as the Supreme 
Court upheld a policy almost identical to that laid out in AB 5:04B63. 
The Third Circuit then turned their analysis to CEPP patients, who are different from 
non-CEPP patients, as they have already been deemed to no longer need or qualify for 
involuntary confinement and are remaining in custody until they are transferred to a different 
facility64.  The court stated that Harper65 did not address this situation, so it cannot control the 
analysis66, and instead, turned to another case, Matthews v. Eldridge67, which used a balancing 
test that is more appropriate to this situation.  After applying that test, the court held that AB 
5:04B cannot apply to CEPP patients68.  If a patient is truly in need of psychotropic drugs and is 
refusing, New Jersey should recommit the patient, removing them from CEPP status, before 
                                                        
58 Id. at 306. 
59 Id. at 307. 
60 Id. at 297. 
61 Id. at 307. 
62 Washington, 494 U.S. 210. 
63 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 308, 307. 
64 Id. at 309. 
65 Washington, 494 U.S. 210. 
66 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 309. 
67 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 229 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). 
68 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 310. 
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doing so.  Otherwise, the person’s constitutional rights are violated.  Therefore, CEPP patients 
are entitled to a judicial process before being forcibly medicated, per their constitutional rights69. 
In summary, the Third Circuit did not address the issue of the right to refuse forcible 
medication as a right protected under Title II of the ADA or the Constitution70.  Instead, the issue 
addressed is whether civilly committed patients who refuse forcible medication are entitled to a 
judicial process.  The court held that the process outlined in AB 5:04B does not violate Title II of 
the ADA, but does violate the Constitution for CEPP patients71.   
 
C. Analysis of Disability Rights N.J. Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs 
There is some indication in the Third Circuit’s opinion that if the plaintiffs had claimed 
that the right of refusal, instead of the judicial process, was the service, program, or activity 
being excluded from civilly committed patients, the court would have used a different analysis 
and the case may have had a different outcome.  The court made it very clear that this was not 
what was being argued before them, and asked Disability Rights to clarify their argument before 
undergoing any type of analysis72.  It can be implied, then, that their holding can only be applied 
to the specific argument presented by Disability Rights, and the question of whether the right of 
refusal is a viable argument is still open.   
The court first asked the plaintiffs to clarify their argument because they referred to both 
the right of refusal and the judicial process as being the activity, program, or service that was 
being withheld from civilly committed patients73.  After asking for clarification, the plaintiffs 
                                                        
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 304. 
71 Id. at 307, 310. 
72 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 302-303. 
73 Id. at 307, 310. 
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stated that their argument was limited to the lack of judicial process, and the court discussed at 
great length how they were bound by this answer when analyzing the argument74.  Given the 
court’s great care in ensuring that they did not include the right of refusal in their analysis, and 
the great care they took in ensuring that the parties knew that this was not included in their 
decision, it begs the question whether the Third Circuit believes that the right of refusal was the 
better argument.  In other words, it leaves one to wonder what the outcome of the case would 
have been if the plaintiffs had answered differently, and stated that the right of refusal was the 
activity, service, or program being withheld. 
There are a few other indications within the opinion that bolsters this theory.  The Third 
Circuit alludes to the fact that a right of refusal could be considered an activity, program, or 
service under Title II of the ADA.  Specifically, they state that the “phrase ‘service, program, or 
activity is extremely broad in scope and includes ‘anything a public entity does’”75.  The court 
then quotes Title II of the ADA, pointing out that the “regulations provide that ‘[a] public entity, 
in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or 
other arrangements, . . . limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any 
right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or 
service’"76.  Finally, the court almost says it outright: “[A]lthough we assume that the right to 
refuse medical treatment (or another such right, whether it be common-law or statutory) could be 
a service, program, or activity within the meaning of Title II, this is not the service, program, or 
activity posited by Disability Rights”77.  This can be interpreted as an admission that the right to 
                                                        
74 Id. at 302-304. 
75 Id. at 301, quoting Yeskey v. Pa. Dep't of Corrs., 118 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1997). 
76 Id. at 301-302, quoting 28 CFR 35.130. 
77 Id. at 302. 
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refuse is still a valid claim and should have been argued by the plaintiffs.  Unfortunately, the 
plaintiffs utilized a different approach, and the court was bound by that argument78.   
The Third Circuit appeared open to the argument outlined above, which would have led 
to a different outcome and given patients greater protections while under the state’s care.  It is 
argued in this paper that this is exactly the case, and unless AB 5:04B is revised in some way, 
perhaps to be similar to Vermont’s statute that allows the execution of DPOAs, then the mental 
health patients that are civilly committed in New Jersey and being forcibly medicated are 
suffering from unlawful discrimination.  Alternatively, the plaintiffs could have also sought relief 
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution if they had reframed the issue during 
their argument.  A different outcome would have occurred if the plaintiffs had utilized either 
argument. 
 
D. Title II of the ADA 
 1. History 
 At this point, it is appropriate to focus on the American with Disabilities Act.  The Act is 
broad, so Title II will be the main focus, since it is the focus of the dispute in the above case.  In 
order to fully understand the issue of this paper, the scope and intent of the statute should be 
discussed and some examples of the statute protecting individuals with disabilities should be 
examined. 
 Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to combat discrimination against people with 
disabilities79.  It had large support in both houses after a task force presented evidence of 
                                                        
78 Id. at 304. 
79 42 USCS § 12101 
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discrimination against people with disabilities80.  In particular, Congress found that “historically, 
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some 
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a 
serious and pervasive social problem”81.  Congress also reached the conclusion that “physical or 
mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate in all aspects of 
society”82.  In response, Congress enacted the ADA and gave it the power necessary to remedy 
the wrongs they discovered.  Specifically, the ADA “invoke[s] the sweep of congressional 
authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, 
in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with 
disabilities”83. 
 The ADA has three distinct parts, all regulating different aspects of life in order to 
accommodate people with disabilities.  Title II is concerned with public services and regulates 
both state and local governments84.  It specifically states that “no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity”85.  Also, the types of mental health issues that would warrant 
civil commitment are included in the ADA’s definition of disability86.  As a result, the ADA 
could provide a remedy for the issue present in Disability Rights N.J., Inc87.   
                                                        
80 Id. 
81 42 USCS § 12101(a)(2) 
82 42 USCS § 12101(a)(1) 
83 42 USCS § 12101(b)(4) 
84 42 USCS § 12131 
85 42 USCS § 12132 
86 42 USCS § 12102 
87 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d 293. 
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 There is an exception for state governments included in Title II. The regulation states that 
the government only needs to make a reasonable modification, and that if the modification would 
fundamentally alter the program, service or activity, the state does not have to make the 
modification88.  Therefore, it is up to the government to prove that any alteration would make a 
fundamental difference; if they cannot support this claim, the modification must be made. 
 
 2. Title II of the ADA in Court 
 Several cases have been argued seeking remedies provided by Title II of the ADA, but 
none have argued that forcible medication of civilly committed patients in a non-emergency 
situation is prohibited89.  A variety of other claims have been settled under Title II, though, 
demonstrating the ADA’s strength and legislative breadth.  In Tennessee v. Lane, the plaintiff 
sued the state for a lack of accommodations necessary to access the courthouse90.  The case 
reached the Supreme Court, which held that the claim was appropriately brought under Title II of 
the ADA and that creating an accommodation would not fundamentally alter the courthouse91.  
In Olmstead v. L. C. by Zimring, the plaintiffs were mental health patients seeking placement in a 
different facility, and they argued that the defendant’s refusal to transfer them was discrimination 
under Title II of the ADA92.  The defendants raised the reasonable modifications defense, and the 
Supreme Court stated that while the defense is valid, the defendants must prove that placing the 
plaintiffs in a different treatment program would truly be more than a reasonable modification93.  
Finally, in Cal. Council of the Blind v. County of Alameda, the plaintiffs were blind and brought 
                                                        
88 28 CFR 35.130 
89 Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Velez, 974 F. Supp. 2d 736 (D.N.J. 2013). 
90 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
91 Id. 
92 527 U.S. 581 (1999).  
93 Id. 
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an action under Title II of the ADA for a lack of accommodation when voting in elections94.  The 
court in that case found for the plaintiffs95.  Although there are many other cases brought under 
Title II of the ADA, these three demonstrate the variety of issues that are covered by the act.  
This is consistent with the purpose and scope of the act, as Congress intended for the ADA to 
remedy a variety of wrongs suffered by those with disabilities96.   
 Title II of the ADA gives citizens a private right of action, allowing people who have 
physical or mental disabilities to file a lawsuit for discrimination97.  Title II specifically prohibits 
state and local governments from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities98, 
unless a modification would present an undue burden or fundamental alteration of the program, 
service or activity that is in dispute99.  While this relieves some pressure off the state or local 
government, the government still carries the burden of proof when arguing that the modification 
would fit the exception.  A variety of different claims can be brought under the act, and although 
unattempted, arguing that the right to refuse forcible medication in non-emergency situations for 
civilly committed mental health patients is a violation of the act. 
 
E. Forcible Medication of Civilly Committed Patients in Non-Emergency Situations is a 
Violation of Title II of the ADA 
 As the Third Circuit indicated, forcible medication of civilly committed patients in non-
emergency situations is prohibited by Title II of the ADA100.  In order for this claim to proceed, 
                                                        
94 985 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 2013).  
95 Id. 
96 42 USCS § 12101 
97 Id. 
98 42 USCS § 12131 
99 28 CFR 35.130 
100 Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d 293. 
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the requirements set out by the ADA must be met101, and a reasonable modification must be 
possible102.  The argument that the plaintiffs in Disability Rights N.J., Inc.103 should have 
brought is laid out below. 
 First, Title II is addressed to state and local governments, so the discrimination must be a 
result of the state or local government’s action104.  That requirement is satisfied in the case, 
because the psychiatric hospitals are operated and funded by the state of New Jersey105.  As a 
result, this criterion is not an issue.  Second, only “qualified individuals” may bring suit106.  This 
means that only individuals who would need the services provided by the psychiatric hospitals 
can file a lawsuit, which also is not an issue in this case.  Finally, the remedy must be reasonable, 
and any modifications made cannot fundamentally alter the program, service, or activity107.  That 
will be addressed below, but does not pose a problem in this situation. 
 Similar to the above cases, Disability Rights could have shown that AB 5:04B is 
discriminatory on its face, because it does not allow mentally ill patients the right to refuse 
medication in non-emergency situations108.  Generally, this is a right conferred upon others that 
are not mentally ill.  For example, if someone goes to the doctor for a cold and the doctor 
prescribes a medicine, the patient is under no obligation to fill the prescription or to take the 
medicine.  AB 5:04B treats those who are mentally ill differently than those who are not 
mentally ill, which is the very definition of discrimination.  This type of treatment is born out of 
the stigma associated with mental health.  It appears that the state of New Jersey believes its 
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judgment concerning medication is better than those with mental health issues.  However, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that mental health patients have a significant interest in whether 
or not they are medicated109.  The dissent in Washington v. Harper states that “[e]very violation 
of a person’s bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty. . . . And when the purpose or 
effect of forced drugging is to alter the will and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a 
deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense”110.  The dissenting justices go on 
to say that the ability to refuse forced medication is a basic value of our society, and that those 
who are not mentally ill have been granted the right to refuse medication because their 
fundamental rights are protected111.  This differential treatment is discrimination—protecting the 
rights of those that are mentally competent, but overriding the rights of those that are mentally ill 
through a procedural process in a psychiatric hospital. 
 Of course, a right is not the same thing as a “program[], service[] or activit[y]”112.  This 
might be the source of the difficulty the Third Circuit faced while deciding Disability Rights113.  
However, some of the cases brought under Title II of the ADA dealt with rights that had been 
denied those with a disability because of a lack of an appropriate program, service or activity.  
For example, as discussed above, the plaintiff in Tennessee v. Lane had been denied the right to 
vote because he was unable to get to the voting booth as a result of his disability114.  Voting is 
considered a fundamental right in this country115.  In Tennessee, the need for a program, service, 
or activity was directly tied to a fundamental right—if the plaintiff was unable to access the 
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voting booth, he was essentially being denied a fundamental right116.  A similar situation arose in 
Cal. Council of the Blind v. County of Alameda when the plaintiffs were also unable to vote as a 
result of their disability117.  The plaintiffs sued for a different machine that would allow them to 
vote, which is considered a program, service, or activity.  Again, the accommodation was 
directly tied to a fundamental right, and without the accommodation, the fundamental right was 
denied.  In Disability Rights, the plaintiffs are denied the right to refuse medication in non-
emergency situations.  The program, service, or activity that could be instituted is not necessarily 
an automatic accommodation of that right.  In other words, the remedy is not necessarily giving 
civilly committed patients the absolute right to refuse medication.  The remedy would be 
implementing a program, service, or activity that would protect their right to refuse medication 
through a hearing process.  The procedural hearing process in place right now is inadequate to 
protect the fundamental rights of civilly committed patients.  This remedy is discussed in more 
detail below.   
 The ADA was designed to prevent such situations from even occurring118, and the facts 
presented in this case are a violation of the prohibitions contained in the statute.  People suffering 
from mental health problems still have a liberty interest in what happens to their body119, and if 
they are not deemed dangerous, then they should be considered competent to make their own 
decisions.  As such, if the plaintiffs in Disability Rights had argued the case in another way, the 
results would have been different. 
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F. Forcible Medication of Civilly Committed Patients in Non-Emergency Situations is a 
Violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment 
 1. Substantive Due Process 
 Another argument the plaintiffs made in Disability Rights is that the plaintiffs’ due 
process rights were violated120.  The court only analyzed a procedural due process claim, and 
held that non-CEPP patients’ due process rights were not violated by the process allowing 
forcible medication, but that CEPP patients’ rights were violated, and their due process rights 
required a judicial process121.  While the procedural due process claim may not have merit for 
non-CEPP patients, a substantive due process claim should. 
 The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment has both procedural and substantive components.  The procedural component 
encompasses the right to a procedural due process, and the Supreme Court has protected that 
right on a number of occasions122.  The Court has also recognized that the Due Process Clause 
contains a substantive component123.  The substantive component protects a person’s liberty, as 
stated in the clause, and the Court has used these words on a number of occasions to curtail 
government action124.  The plaintiffs in Disability Rights should have argued that the way AB 
5:04B reads is a violation of substantive due process. 
 The patients in New Jersey’s psychiatric hospitals have a fundamental right to refuse 
forcible medication.  As discussed above, the dissenting justices in Washington v. Harper 
recognized this right, and disagreed with the majority in the outcome of the case, believing that 
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the right to say what happens to one’s body is a fundamental liberty interest125.  This right is 
ground in a number of Supreme Court cases, starting with Griswold v. Connecticut, where the 
Court established a right to privacy and bodily autonomy126.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized implied fundamental rights, such as the right to bodily autonomy and integrity, which 
are not expressly stated in the Constitution127.  With this judicial recognition as a foundation, and 
with the Court’s willingness to find implied fundamental rights in a variety of cases, it can be 
easily inferred that the right to refuse forcible medication is another such right.   
 Once it has been established that the right to refuse medication is a fundamental right, the 
court should use strict scrutiny to determine whether AB 5:04B violates that right, meaning that 
the court will examine the policy extremely closely to determine whether or not it should be 
upheld.  This is a tier of review that the Supreme Court has previously utilized whenever a 
fundamental right has allegedly been violated128.  Legislation that inhibits fundamental rights is 
allowed as long as there is a compelling state or government interest and the legislation is 
narrowly tailored to address the problem129.  Here, AB 5:04B fails both prongs of the test—the 
government interest is not compelling and the policy is not narrowly tailored.  First, the 
government interest is not compelling because AB 5:04B only applies in non-emergency 
situations, implying that the government simply wishes to medicate the patient because the state 
believes that is the best mode of treatment.  The patient has not been deemed to be a danger to 
him or herself, others, or property.  Therefore, the government would need to produce another 
reason as to why they are forcibly medicating in these situations.  Next, AB 5:04B is not 
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narrowly tailored, because it allows forcible medication anytime the hearing committee decides 
this is the best course of action.  The patient has a chance to be heard during the hearing process, 
but if his or her wishes are overridden, then the hearing panel has the final decision.  There is no 
other alternative built in for the patient to protect his or her choice of treatment.  The government 
has other available alternatives to ensure that the patient’s treatment wishes are respected while 
also effectively treating the patient, such as engaging in other modes of therapy, assigning the 
patient a DPOA as in Hargrave130, or allowing the patient to go off of his or her medication and 
then allowing the patient to decide what he or she wants in terms of treatment.  Policy AB 5:04B 
only provides for the hearing process as a remedy for a patient who refuses medication, and the 
Supreme Court generally does not allow that sort of broad or all-encompassing solution when a 
fundamental right is at stake.   
 The plaintiffs in Disability Rights argued that their procedural due process rights were 
violated by AB 5:04B, and the Third Circuit rejected this argument for non-CEPP patients131.  
Procedural due process rights generally only guarantee that a process is in place that allows a 
person to voice his or her concerns; therefore, a judicial process is not guaranteed by the Due 
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment132.  Unfortunately, the plaintiffs did not argue that their 
substantive due process rights were violated, which very well may have been a winning 
argument.  The patients have a liberty interest in resisting medication, which is a fundamental 
right protected by the Constitution.  As a result, the Third Circuit would need to engage in a 
heightened level of review—strict scrutiny—when analyzing whether or not AB 5:04B should be 
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upheld.  Since the government interest is not compelling and the policy is not narrowly tailored, 
it should be struck down. 
 1. Procedural Due Process 
 Disability Rights attempted to make a procedural due process argument and failed in 
regards to non-CEPP patients133.  However, if they reframed their procedural due process 
argument, then the case would have had a different outcome.  As discussed earlier, the Third 
Circuit hinted at such a situation when discussing whether or not the plaintiff’s argument was a 
right to refuse medication or the need for a judicial process134.  If the plaintiffs had argued that 
their procedural due process rights were violated because they were not afforded adequate 
protection when refusing medication, the court would have found in favor of the plaintiffs for 
both CEPP and non-CEPP patients. 
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed issues arising out of the procedural 
component of the Due Process Clause, giving citizens rights to express their concerns when they 
have been deprived of life, liberty, or property135.  As both Harper136 and Disability Rights137 
have demonstrated, that hearing does not always mean that a judicial process is warranted.  
However, the more serious the alleged harm, the more likely the court will be to hold that a 
procedural issue exists.  The plaintiffs in Disability Rights are deprived of a right that is central 
to our societal values—liberty.  The plaintiffs have a liberty interest in having their right to 
refuse medication in non-emergency situations by a more robust procedural process.  The Third 
Circuit engaged in the Mathews balancing test when analyzing whether or not CEPP patients’ 
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procedural due process rights had been violated, but not for non-CEPP patients138.  This is a 
direct result of how the argument was framed.  The plaintiffs argued that a judicial process was 
required instead of arguing that a procedural process that better protects the right to refuse 
medication is necessary.  Since that was the argument, the Third Circuit relied on Harper when 
analyzing the claim for non-CEPP patients, because it is binding authority139.  Harper did not 
apply to CEPP patients, so the Third Circuit relied on the Mathews balancing test140. If the 
plaintiffs had argued that the right to refuse was the program, service, or activity that was denied, 
the Third Circuit would have found the procedural process outlined in Policy 5:04B inadequate 
for both CEPP and non-CEPP patients. 
 If analyzing the claim that the right to refuse medication is what is being denied patients 
at psychiatric hospitals in New Jersey, the Third Circuit would not be able to rely on Harper141, 
but instead would have to utilize the Mathews balancing test142.  Harper applies when the 
argument is that a judicial process is required to protect procedural due process rights; here, it is 
argued that a more robust procedure is required, and not necessarily one that is judicial in nature.  
The Third Circuit would need to balance the following factors: (1) “the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action” (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail."143  After balancing these factors with the facts present in Disability Rights144, the Third 
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Circuit would hold that a more robust procedural process must be in place to protect a citizen’s 
right to refuse forcible medication in non-emergency situations. 
 First, the “private interest that will be affected by the official action”145 is substantial.  
The dissent in Harper vehemently stated that people have a strong liberty interest in resisting 
forcible medication, stating that such a violation of a person’s liberty deserves the highest 
protection146.  Bodily autonomy and integrity is what is affected by the official action, and it 
deserves more protection than what AB 5:04B current gives.  Next, "the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards"147 also tips in the plaintiffs’ favor.  The risk of 
error is great—citizens are forced to endure a treatment that they do not choose, even in non-
emergency situations.  They must endure the side effects of psychotropic medication, which can 
be great148.  They also must endure the humiliation of submitting to another person when it 
comes to treating their mental illness or disorder.  This is amplified when considering the second 
prong of this requirement—the probable value of additional procedural safeguards.  If the 
procedural process that allowed patients to voice their concerns were more robust, then it is 
likely that fewer patients would have to be forcibly medicated.  Third, "the Government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail" also sides with the plaintiff149.  The 
government has an interest in treating patients that are admitted to their psychiatric hospitals.  
They also have an interest in keeping these patients safe and helping them function at their 
                                                        
145 Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 at 335. 
146 Washington, 494 U.S. at 238. 
147 Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 at 335. 
148 Washington, 494 U.S. 210. 
149 Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 at 335. 
 28 
highest level possible.  The government’s interest can be protected with a more robust procedural 
process, and the additional expense would be minimal.  The process is already in place, as 
described in Disability Rights150, so the changes would incur minimal expense.  The changes 
would ensure that the patients’ concerns were heard and protected, while also taking into account 
the government’s wishes in regards to treatment.   
 The plaintiff’s in Disability Rights attempted to make a procedural due process argument, 
but failed in regards to non-CEPP patients151.  The claim should have centered around a patient’s 
right to refuse medication, and not the lack of a judicial process.  If the plaintiff’s had claimed 
that their right to refuse medication was unprotected by the existing procedure found in AB 
5:04B, the Third Circuit would have found in favor of the plaintiffs after engaging in the 
balancing test found in Mathews v. Eldridge152. 
 
E. Remedies and Reasonable Modifications to AB 5:04B 
 1. Allowing a patient to assign a DPOA 
 If the plaintiffs had reframed their argument and relied on one of the two authorities 
outlined above, then the case would have been decided differently.  At that point, the state would 
need to decide how to modify the existing program in order to accommodate those who wish to 
refuse medication.  There are a few alternatives that are available to the government that will not 
fundamentally alter the existing process and can ensure that each patient receives the appropriate 
treatment153.  The fact that there are such alternatives available helps to prove the point made 
earlier—that the policy as it stands violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.  If 
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no alternatives were available, the court could rule that the existing policy is narrowly tailored to 
fit the problem.  However, AB 5:04B is not narrowly tailored and alternatives are available.  The 
best modification is the system available in Vermont—allowing patients to assign a person 
power of attorney and to allow that person to make decisions for them. 
 The Second Circuit has already decided that allowing a patient to execute a DPOA is 
appropriate from both a medical and a legal standpoint154.  Adding this provision to AB 5:04B 
allows the state to accomplish their goal of respecting the patient’s autonomy while also ensuring 
that they receive the best treatment.  By allowing the patient’s voice to be heard when making 
decisions regarding treatment, giving them the autonomy and integrity they deserve, and 
allowing a person who is of sound mind and body to be the person making decisions and 
working with the physicians and psychiatrists when making decisions about treatment, a DPOA 
protects the patient and enables the state to continue operating their psychiatric hospitals as 
unusual.  It is suspected that the state overrides a patient’s wishes because there is little respect 
given for the decisions made by those who suffer from mental illness155.  Perhaps the state views 
the patient to be incompetent, thus believing that the soundness of the patients’ decision to be 
compromised.  The Third Circuit correctly recognized that they can no longer make decisions of 
this nature for CEPP patients, but the judicial system should also respect non-CEPP patients’ 
refusal to be medicated.  Allowing the patient to assign a principal will give the patient that 
freedom and allow the state to discuss treatment options with someone who does not suffer from 
mental illness. 
 Additionally, allowing a patient to execute a DPOA is not a fundamental alteration of the 
program.  The only change would be the assignment of a principal to a patient who refuses to be 
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medicated and requests such an accommodation.  Then, the state would need to treat the 
principal’s decisions in the same way they would treat someone possessing power of attorney for 
someone who is not mentally ill.  In other words, if the state still wishes to override the 
principal’s decision, then that could be done, but only through a process that is not 
discriminatory towards those with mental illnesses.  The process would need to be the same 
process enacted when overriding the power of attorney for someone who is not mentally ill.  The 
process would also need to satisfy the procedural and substantive components of the Due Process 
Clause of the 14th Amendment.   
 The current solution—allowing a court to override a patient’s medical treatment 
preferences—allows a person who is unconnected with the patient to make decisions for them.  
Judges have to find a solution that objectively balances their notion of justice with the law’s 
theories of individual autonomy and liberty.  This is different from a doctor or therapist, who 
tends to make treatment decisions based on what he or she subjectively believes is best for the 
patient.  It is believed that a principal will be more in line with the doctor or the therapist when 
making treatment decisions for the patient, creating an acceptable solution for a difficult 
situation.  It is in the patient’s best interest to have someone who is intimately acquainted with 
his or her medical diagnosis and treatment making decisions for him or her, instead of a third 
party who must weigh other considerations outside of the patient’s treatment.   
 Per Title II of the ADA, the state is required to provide “auxiliary services or aids” to 
accommodate those with disabilities156.  This has been mandated by the judicial system again 
and again, as demonstrated in the discussion regarding the cases successfully brought under Title 
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II of the ADA157.  The option to assign somebody with power of attorney could be another such 
“auxiliary service[] or aid[]” to accommodate someone with a mental health disability.   
 
 2. Mandating that the patient’s counselor be involved 
 Changing AB 5:04B to mandate that the patient’s counselor be present at all hearings and 
be part of the decision making process is another accommodation that could protect the patient.  
The counselor can advocate for the patient and give him or her a voice when the patient would 
not otherwise have a way to speak up for him or herself. 
 As AB 5:04B currently stands, the counselor that works with the mental health patient 
can be present at all hearings, but is not required to be, and is not allowed to be on the panel or 
committee that makes the decision to forcibly medicate the patient.  This is disturbing for a few 
reasons.  Mental health professionals create a certain type of relationship with their patients.  
They see their patients weekly, sometimes daily, and understand their needs in a way that an 
impartial panel or committee does not.  Also, the way that AB 5:04B is written does not ensure 
that the hearing committee is entirely impartial.  It is comprised of professionals that are not 
involved in that particular patient’s case, but all of the professionals work together at the same 
hospital or facility158.  The panel members know each other, and some members may be in 
positions of authority over others, potentially leading to a conflict of interest during a hearing.  
Given this set of facts, it only makes sense that the patient’s counselor be involved in this 
process.  The counselor can educate the panel or committee on the patient’s mental health history 
and why he or she is refusing medication.  In other words, the “auxiliary aid or service” provided 
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would be requiring that the counselor be present at such hearings in order to advocate for the 
patient.   
 In addition to those explained above, there are also several alternatives the state could 
utilize to change AB 5:04B to be less discriminatory towards mental health patients who refuse 
medication.  The remedies discussed are just a few that are available, but would help to satisfy 
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and Title II of the 
ADA.  Allowing a patient to assign a DPOA has already been approved by the Second Circuit159, 
indicating that it is a reasonable remedy that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the 
existing program in New Jersey.  Mandating that a counselor be present at the hearings has not 
been proposed, yet, but it is another component that could be added to AB 5:04B that would 
allow the patients to have an advocate that truly understands their needs. 
 
F. Conclusion 
 People with disabilities have long faced discrimination by both private individuals and 
the government160.  Those suffering from mental disabilities are no exception, and many are 
subjected to a lifetime of treatment and misunderstanding.  Forcibly medicating a patient in a 
non-emergency situation is not something that has been widely analyzed by courts in this 
country; however, some courts have tackled the issue with mixed results161.  The courts have to 
balance the autonomy of the patient and the interests of the state, which may be tainted by beliefs 
that people suffering from mental disorders cannot make sound decisions for themselves.  This 
can be a difficult balance to strike, but it is possible.  The plaintiffs in Disability Rights have 
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valid arguments, but they were not presented or addressed in the recent decision handed down by 
the Third Circuit162.  As it stands, AB 5:04B violates both Title II of the ADA and the Due 
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.  If New Jersey allowed civilly committed mental health 
patients to execute a DPOA, then both of those violations would be satisfied and the existing 
program would not be fundamentally altered.  
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